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East Greenwich Fire District, 138 A.3d 163, 166 (R. 2016) (quoting Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association of Rhode Island v. at 166-67 (quoting Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association of Rhode Island, 115 A.3d at 1002). The parameters of res judicata are determined by a “broad ‘transactional’ rule.” Ritter, 864 A.2d at 605 (quoting El Gabri, 681 A.2d at 276). We discern no language in said section that signifies an intent by the General Assembly to authorize the Family Court to construe or enforce testamentary documents.“The doctrine of collateral estoppel makes conclusive in a later action on a different claim the determination of issues that were actually litigated in a prior action.” E. IIIIssues on Appeal The defendant argues on appeal that the hearing justice erred in awarding plaintiff a specific bequest under the will. In effect, the “rule precludes the re-litigation of ‘all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the [first] action arose.’ ” Id. “What factual grouping constitutes a ‘transaction,’ and what groupings constitute a ‘series,’ are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations * * *.” Ritter, 864 A.2d at 605 (quoting El Gabri, 681 A.2d at 276). Glassie, * * * the sum of ,000,000.00, or such other amount as shall be then required to fully satisfy all of my remaining obligations and responsibilities pursuant to the terms and provisions of that certain Property Settlement Agreement dated July 1, 1993, entered into between my former spouse, Marcia S.Glassie, and me, as the same may be amended from time to time. 644, 646-47, 226 A.2d 420, 421-22 (1967), where the plaintiffs were “denied recovery of interest because [the statute] did not encompass actions sounding in contract.” Gott, 417 A.2d at 1357. In light of our previous analysis, it is clear to us that this is not a “civil action arising from a breach of contract”; moreover, there does exist a justiciable issue concerning testator's testamentary intent which requires litigation and factfinding.The hearing justice denied plaintiff's request for prejudgment interest, but ultimately awarded her the full requested amount of attorney's fees. CLife Insurance Proceeds The plaintiff argues that the hearing justice erred in sua sponte reducing the amount of her bequest by the amount of the proceeds of a life insurance policy that testator had purchased, naming plaintiff as the beneficiary. We perceive no basis for linking the life insurance proceeds with the ,000,000 bequest. Final judgment in both cases pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure entered on March 30, 2015, awarding plaintiff ,000,000 “pursuant to the [1998 will], less 7,861.59 in life insurance proceeds from an insurance policy on the life of [testator], for a net award of

East Greenwich Fire District, 138 A.3d 163, 166 (R. 2016) (quoting Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association of Rhode Island v. at 166-67 (quoting Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association of Rhode Island, 115 A.3d at 1002). The parameters of res judicata are determined by a “broad ‘transactional’ rule.” Ritter, 864 A.2d at 605 (quoting El Gabri, 681 A.2d at 276). We discern no language in said section that signifies an intent by the General Assembly to authorize the Family Court to construe or enforce testamentary documents.“The doctrine of collateral estoppel makes conclusive in a later action on a different claim the determination of issues that were actually litigated in a prior action.” E. IIIIssues on Appeal The defendant argues on appeal that the hearing justice erred in awarding plaintiff a specific bequest under the will. In effect, the “rule precludes the re-litigation of ‘all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the [first] action arose.’ ” Id. “What factual grouping constitutes a ‘transaction,’ and what groupings constitute a ‘series,’ are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations * * *.” Ritter, 864 A.2d at 605 (quoting El Gabri, 681 A.2d at 276). Glassie, * * * the sum of $2,000,000.00, or such other amount as shall be then required to fully satisfy all of my remaining obligations and responsibilities pursuant to the terms and provisions of that certain Property Settlement Agreement dated July 1, 1993, entered into between my former spouse, Marcia S.Glassie, and me, as the same may be amended from time to time. 644, 646-47, 226 A.2d 420, 421-22 (1967), where the plaintiffs were “denied recovery of interest because [the statute] did not encompass actions sounding in contract.” Gott, 417 A.2d at 1357. In light of our previous analysis, it is clear to us that this is not a “civil action arising from a breach of contract”; moreover, there does exist a justiciable issue concerning testator's testamentary intent which requires litigation and factfinding.The hearing justice denied plaintiff's request for prejudgment interest, but ultimately awarded her the full requested amount of attorney's fees. CLife Insurance Proceeds The plaintiff argues that the hearing justice erred in sua sponte reducing the amount of her bequest by the amount of the proceeds of a life insurance policy that testator had purchased, naming plaintiff as the beneficiary. We perceive no basis for linking the life insurance proceeds with the $2,000,000 bequest. Final judgment in both cases pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure entered on March 30, 2015, awarding plaintiff $2,000,000 “pursuant to the [1998 will], less $437,861.59 in life insurance proceeds from an insurance policy on the life of [testator], for a net award of $1,562,138.41.” In addition, the trial justice awarded plaintiff attorney's fees of $42,440.55, denied plaintiff's motion for prejudgment interest, and denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. “In reviewing the Superior Court's judgment on the parties' motions for summary judgment, we * * * apply the same standards as those used by the trial court.” Id. The defendant had not raised the issue in the summary-judgment proceedings, and we deem it error for the hearing justice to have done so. The marriage dissolved and on July 1, 1993, testator and plaintiff entered into a property-settlement agreement (the agreement).Under the terms of the agreement, testator undertook a number of financial obligations.

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East Greenwich Fire District, 138 A.3d 163, 166 (R. 2016) (quoting Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association of Rhode Island v. at 166-67 (quoting Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association of Rhode Island, 115 A.3d at 1002). The parameters of res judicata are determined by a “broad ‘transactional’ rule.” Ritter, 864 A.2d at 605 (quoting El Gabri, 681 A.2d at 276). We discern no language in said section that signifies an intent by the General Assembly to authorize the Family Court to construe or enforce testamentary documents.“The doctrine of collateral estoppel makes conclusive in a later action on a different claim the determination of issues that were actually litigated in a prior action.” E.

IIIIssues on Appeal The defendant argues on appeal that the hearing justice erred in awarding plaintiff a specific bequest under the will. In effect, the “rule precludes the re-litigation of ‘all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the [first] action arose.’ ” Id. “What factual grouping constitutes a ‘transaction,’ and what groupings constitute a ‘series,’ are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations * * *.” Ritter, 864 A.2d at 605 (quoting El Gabri, 681 A.2d at 276).

Glassie, * * * the sum of $2,000,000.00, or such other amount as shall be then required to fully satisfy all of my remaining obligations and responsibilities pursuant to the terms and provisions of that certain Property Settlement Agreement dated July 1, 1993, entered into between my former spouse, Marcia S.

Glassie, and me, as the same may be amended from time to time. 644, 646-47, 226 A.2d 420, 421-22 (1967), where the plaintiffs were “denied recovery of interest because [the statute] did not encompass actions sounding in contract.” Gott, 417 A.2d at 1357. In light of our previous analysis, it is clear to us that this is not a “civil action arising from a breach of contract”; moreover, there does exist a justiciable issue concerning testator's testamentary intent which requires litigation and factfinding.

,562,138.41.” In addition, the trial justice awarded plaintiff attorney's fees of ,440.55, denied plaintiff's motion for prejudgment interest, and denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. “In reviewing the Superior Court's judgment on the parties' motions for summary judgment, we * * * apply the same standards as those used by the trial court.” Id. The defendant had not raised the issue in the summary-judgment proceedings, and we deem it error for the hearing justice to have done so. The marriage dissolved and on July 1, 1993, testator and plaintiff entered into a property-settlement agreement (the agreement).Under the terms of the agreement, testator undertook a number of financial obligations.

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In addition, the defendant also appeals from the trial justice's award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff appeals from the trial justice's denial of prejudgment interest.

On March 20, 1998, testator executed a subsequent will.

Thereafter, he executed a codicil to this will, dated June 1998, the twelfth provision of this will provided, in pertinent part, that:“TWELFTH: I give, devise and bequeath to my former spouse, Marcia S.

To the extent such obligations and responsibilities remain executory, they shall survive my death, and shall be binding upon and constitute a charge upon my estate.”Thereafter, the case was remanded to the Family Court for further proceedings. In particular, this Court noted that “[t]he Legislature responded with the addition of the words ‘civil action’ in 1976.” Id. 2000), we concluded that § 9-21-10(a) did not apply to reimbursement actions for workers' compensation claims, pursuant to G. 1956 chapter 34 of title 27 (the Insolvency Fund Act), because “[t]he reimbursement that the [plaintiff] [was] permitted to recover [was] set forth in the Insolvency Fund Act, and therefore, * * * § 9-21-10 [was] inapplicable * * *.” Leviton Manufacturing Co., 763 A.2d at 597-98. Consequently, we find no basis under § 9-1-45 for an award of attorney's fees.

On August 4, 1998, plaintiff and testator stipulated in the Family Court that the will dated March 20, 1998, as amended by the codicil dated June 1998, was in “full compliance” with the agreement. 24, 28, 327 A.2d 831, 834 (1974) and Rhode Island Dairy Queen, Inc. Therefore, this Court concluded that the Legislature intended to align tort and contract plaintiffs to receive prejudgment interest on judgments. Similarly, in Rhode Island Insurers' Insolvency Fund v. Here, plaintiff avers that prejudgment interest should be added to the award because the claim “arises out of the contractual obligation in the * * * agreement.” We disagree. 1999) (indicating that property-settlement agreement not merged with divorce judgment is governed by contract law), we believe that is not the case at bar. VConclusion For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court, and remand the matter for further proceedings.

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